Background: At the request of the Editor of International Psychogeriatrics, a statistical audit of all papers published in the journal during 2003 was undertaken by the statistical advisor to International Psychogeriatrics.
From the title, you may be wondering whether this is another one of those esoteric, unintelligible statistics articles. Or whether the author is another pedantic statistician telling you how much you don't know. I hope that you will find that neither of these fears applies. There are no formulas, derivations, or complex figures here. And I am no "statistician," at least not in the formal sense, although I do teach statistics. Rather, the focus of this article is to identify and explain, for the clinician consumer of the literature, four basic but often overlooked issues in statistics (as practiced in today's medical and social science journals). Although it is true that most clinicians are misinformed about things statistical (Wulff et al., 1987) , it is also true that most academic psychologists and physician researchers-and a surprising number of statisticians-are too (Cohen, 1994; Falk &Greenbaum, 1995; Goodman, 1999a; Oakes, 1986) .
ISSUE #1: STATISTICAL INFERENCE AND THE p VALUE
The most important and pervasive error with regard to statistical inference is the notion that significance tests tell us something about the status of the null hypothesis (i.e., the thing we are trying to reject in our hypothesis testing that says the effect or relationship is zero) for a given study. As many authors have clearly demonstrated, standard hypothesis testing does not tell us whether the null hypothesis is true or false (Cohen, 1990 (Cohen, , 1994 Falk & Greenbaum, 1995; Goodman, 1999a) . It can't, most obviously because the probabilities against which we evaluate our results--the source of the infamous p value-ussume that the null hypothesis is true. A p value of .05 does not mean that the null hypothesis is false with a degree of confidence of 95%. Rather, it means that, assuming the null hypothesis to be true in the population, the obtained results are unlikely (ie., they would occur only 5 times out of 100 in a theoretical, population-based sampling distribution containing all possible results when the null hypothesis is true).
Unfortunately, by the rules of logic, finding unlikely results under the assumption of "no difference" is not the same thing as a false null hypothesis (Cohen, 1994) . Probability values, no matter how low, cannot confirm the truth or falsity of our theories and hypotheses. 
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In standard hypothesis testing, we simply deductively calculate the frequency of every possible outcome of our study (Goodman, 1999a) . The results of any single experiment are judged either "likely" or "unlikely," with the p value functioning as the index of likelihood (but without any concern for the strength of this "likely" or "unlikely" event-an important omission, as detailed in Issue #2 below).
There are (at least) two other common errors about statistical inference. First, a p value of .05 does not mean that 100 replications of the experiment would yield 95 significant results. The power of a study to detect differences must be considered (see Issue #3 below), because power has a strong impact on the likelihood of significant results across replications (Cohen, 1994) . Second, the p value obtained in a given study should not be confused with the false-positive (Type I) error rate under the null hypothesis (which is set prior to data collection [in practice, generally assumed at .05] and signified by "alpha"). As Goodman (1999a) notes, hypothesis testing was designed to limit errors, including falsepositive errors, "over the long run." The p value, then, becomes only a tool for evaluating statistical significance relative to alpha; it is not a data-specific false-positive error probability. Both of these errors contribute to the apotheosis of the ~7 value: the mistaken notion that it tells us everything we need to know about the results of the study (e.g., replicability, error vulnerability).
So for a single study, the obtained p value is neither an index of truth, nor an index of replication probability, nor the probability of a false-positive error. It is neither permissible nor desirable, then, to accept conclusions from a study that reflect a "mere linguistic transformation" of the p value into a verbal statement (Goodman, 1999a) . Although alternatives to the p value have been touted that address its limitations, they are beyond the scope and focus of this article (Browner & Newman, 1987; Goodman, 1999b) .
ISSUE #2: EFFECT SIZE
What difference does a low p value make anyway? The old dictum is worth repeating: Statistical significance does not equal practical significance. Beware of phrases like "highly significant," "marginally significant," or "a trend toward significance." These meaningless phrases are due to our mechanical, slavish devotion to the .05 p value cutoff as an indicator of the "realness" of a specific result (Cohen, 1994; Goodman, 1999a) , this devotion being a product of the misinterpretations noted in Issue #1 above. As Goodman .(1999a) points out, what scientific meaning can be attached to p values when a "close" p value (e.g., .08) is interpreted as '/no difference" when comparing nonequivalent groups at baseline, but "marginally significant" when reporting an expected (and therefore essential) relationship? This dominion of the p value leads to a disregard for effect size.
Regrettably, effect size estimates are still rare in the published literature, although appeals for their inclusion have been made repeatedly (Cohen, 1994) . Indices of effect size include eta-squared (qz), omega-squared (a2), Cohen' s d, and-believe it or not-confidence intervals. The first two are "proportion of variance" indices. They range from 0% Statistical Issues for Clinicians to 100% (theoretically), and give us an indication of, for example, the amount of variance in the outcome measure that is associated with (or explained by or shared with) the independent or treatment variable. If you are likening this to a squared correlation coefficient or R2 in regression, you understand the concept. The latter two indices are based on the standard deviation, and essentially express the outcome in standard deviation units: How big is the obtained difference (e.g., between drug and placebo group) relative to the variability of the outcome measure? This signal-to-noise concept is also represented in the width of confidence intervals.
Effect sizes are not silver bullets, however. Eta-squared and omega-squared are, like means, subject to the vagaries of sampling, and should themselves be reported within confidence intervals (Jaccard & Becker, 1990) . Also, effect size estimates tend to overestimate the population effect size; they, like the p value, cannot be taken as "truth" (Cohen, 1994) .
Nevertheless, for the clinician consumer of the published literature, a consideration of effect size cannot be underestimated. A "highly significant" p value (e.g., one study reported a p value to the seventh decimal place [Nilsson & Lindahl, 19861) may in fact be linked with a very weak effect size (e.g., in the case of a very large sample size). Conversely, a "no difference" finding may be linked with a large effect size (e.g., when the sample size is too small, reliability of measurement is low, or the data do not fit the statistic of choice [see Issue #4 below]). There are numerous published studies that report very small p values, but when the effect size is calculated, one is left to wonder whether a -3 two-tenths standard deviation difference (or a treatment that leaves 97% of the variance in the outcome measure unexplained) would ever be detectable (or meaningful) in the clinic. This neglect of effect size is inextricably linked with the entrenched but mistaken notion that a low p value, by itself for a single study, means something concrete. Effect size must also be considered in light of power (to which 1 alluded when discussing issues of sample size), which is the next issue.
ISSUE #3: POWER
Like the p value, power too is a probability. Empirically, it is the probability that a study will yield a p value of less than alpha (at most .05, by convention), for any given effect size. Conceptually, it is the probability of correctly rejecting a false null hypothesis. Although this conceptual definition sounds important, Cohen and others (Cohen, 1990 (Cohen, , 1994 Tukey, 1991) have pointed out that the null hypothesis is, for all intents and purposes, always false! This is meant only partly facetiously, and illustrates the issue of power: No matter how tiny the effect size for a given analysis, there is some sample size large enough to yield a p value of less than .05 (in the nearly universal case where the null hypothesis assumes an effect size of 0). But there is more: Conversely, a study can have too little power, which is a problem not when the effect size is tiny but when it is substantial.
The important message for the clinician consumer of published research is to understand that a study can be too powerful or too weak. Both of these 6 I. T. Chibnall conditions are testament to the often (of necessity) haphazard nature of clinical and social science research. The clear benefit of an a priori power analysis is that it forces the researcher to take effect size into consideration in the planning of the study (Berry et al., 1998) . By convention (Cohen, 1988) , a study should have an 80% probability of generating a p Value of less than .05 (or .01 or wherever alpha is set) for an effect size that: (a) is suggested by previous research, and/or (b) represents a minimum meaningful difference (Aron & Aron, 1994 ) (i.e., what is the smallest effect size that has clinical relevance, meaning, or practical application?). A power analysis, through its association with effect size, also forces the researcher to face the fact that-in the often cross-sectional, correlational world of clinical and social science research-lots of things are related to lots of other things, often spuriously and arbitrarily (and substantially, by social science standards) (Cohen, 1994) . Effect size estimates across studies and power analyses within studies help us to more carefully consider what of true interest might actually be happening in research.
ISSUE #4: RESPECTING THE DATA
The final issue is about matching the statistical technique to the data at hand. Too often, the statistical techniques that are most familiar or most available (the advent of statistical analysis packages for the PC has done more to produce awful-but very sophisticated-data analyses than any other single event) are forced on an unsuspecting data set, inevitably justified with recourse to the notion that such-and-such a statistic "is robust to violations of its assumptions." On a simpler level, the characteristics of our data, particularly in relation to our study design (e.g., sample/cell sizes), are often ignored, for example with respect to skewness, outliers, variance equality, or ceiling/floor effects (Tabachnik & Fidell, 1996) . We ignore these characteristics to the detriment of the interpretability of our results, which is also a symptom of our reliance on the p value to tell us the truth. There are numerous published articles that report the mean as an indicator of central tendency, but where the standard deviation exceeds the mean by a factor of 2 or more. Other articles report means for scales that can, for example, theoretically range from 0 to 30, butwhere the mean is 1. I recall reviewing a study using logistic regression that made all manner of conclusions about risk factors for the disease under consideration (and where statistically significant odds ratios were found), but where, after the multi-way frequencies were worked out (by me, not by the authors), the entire edifice of conclusions was based on a single case! Issues of robustness aside, how interpretable are these results? The clinician, as consumer of the published literature, must clearly be aware of the nature of the data being analyzed before accepting any of the study conclusions.
SUMMARY
It is hoped that by consideration of these four issues, the interested clinician can more critically and knowledgeably digest what appears in the published literature. Rest assured, there are no perfect Statistical Issuesfor Clinicians studies, and outlining the rules as I have done above does not mean that I consistently adhere to them (far from it). Nevertheless, knowing the issues and critiquing the research forces a recognition of our limitations, and is the next best thing to actually putting all of this into practice on a routine basis. Cohen, J. (1990) . Things I have learned (so far).
American Psychologist, 45, 1304 -1312 . Cohen, J. (1994 issues 1-4) . The purpose of the audit was to critically examine the statistical requirements, as dictated by IP, for articles published in the journal. In some ways, this audit represents an extension of a statistical review that I wrote several years ago for then-Editor Robin Eastwood (Chibnall, 2000) . That review presented some fundamental statistical concepts that may not be specifically addressed in the publication of clinical research. Those comments are still relevant today, both in general and with regard to the audit, so a review of the previous paper may help to clarify the slant of this one.
Method
The method for auditing the 2003 articles was straightforward. First, only research articles that used inferential statistical techniques (as opposed to descriptive statistics) were reviewed. This excluded case-reports and descriptive studies. Second, only the statistical part of the articles was evaluated. The theoretical and methodological/design aspects of the articles were not assessed, nor were ancillary issues like sufficiency of the literature review/references, writing style, uniqueness of the investigation, extent to which conclusions were supported by the data, etc. The reviewers of the articles, of course, had already evaluated these issues. Third, articles were evaluated according to whether they addressed or met certain fundamental statistical issues in the analysis and reporting of data, as follows:
r
Did the authors report or refer to a power analysis for the study? Did the authors address issues of power in reporting results, particularly for null findings?
This criterion is important because every study-by virtue of sample size, variability, and effect size-has more or less ability to detect significant (conventionally, p < 0.05) differences. Readers need to know the size of the effect that the study is capable of interpreting as "statistically significant." Either too many or too few subjects can lead to misinterpretation of the relevance of the results. Power is particularly important when studies fail to find hypothesized differences. If power is too low, the probability of a Type II error (false negative conclusion) is high. Small sample sizes can cause the analysis to miss clinically significant effects. This criterion speaks to the magnitude of the "statistically significant" results. As detailed in the previous report (Chibnall, 2000) , a low p-value does not by itself confer meaning to any result. For any effect size, no matter how small, there is a sample size that will generate a p < 0.05 outcome. The p-value is a probability statement that must be evaluated across many studies. By itself, it tells us almost nothing about the magnitude of the reported results. Effect size indicators like those listed above give the reader this additional information. Sometimes a "statistically significant" finding is inconsequential, because the sample size is large enough to detect very small effects. But the reader needs to know whether the finding is clinically relevant in addition to whether it is statistically significant. This issue is not independent of power analysis. Studies should be powered sufficiently to detect the "minimum meaningful difference" for a given hypothesis (too many subjects maximizes statistical significance, but perhaps for negligible effects; too few subjects increases the probability of a Type II error). That difference should be specified ahead of time, so that if statistically significant effects are found, the reader knows immediately that the effect is large enough to be relevant. By calculating and reporting effect size indicators, the reader can evaluate the magnitude of a given effect, both absolutely and relative to other studies of the same hypotheses. Even for studies without power analyses, post hoc effect size indicators are useful to the reader trying to evaluate the magnitude of a given finding. A reader must be able to evaluate the statistical accuracy and "history" of reported findings. This means that important detail must be included, like indices of variance, degrees of freedom, subject-to-variable ratios, names of tests used, values of statistics (e.g. F, t, χ 2 , R, beta), and the various loadings, coefficients, and indexes characteristic of regression analysis, factor analysis, and discriminant function analysis.
Note that these "fundamental" statistical criteria-selected in consultation with textbooks and published commentaries on the topic of statistical analysisrepresent a subset of the universe of statistical criteria on which the articles could have been evaluated. Such are the vagaries of reviews like this one. I trust that most of you will find usefulness in most of the criteria selected. More importantly, I trust that most of you will agree that attention to these issues in articles submitted to IP will strengthen the quality and impact of the research published therein. Thus, the audit is offered in the spirit of improving the statistical quality of IP.
Results
Twenty articles were reviewed. Table 1 summarizes the audit data. With respect to the criteria for review, none of the articles addressed power of the statistical analyses; half included effect size indicators; about half adjusted statistical analyses for multiple univariate comparisons, where applicable; few attended to or demonstrated the adequacy of the data being analyzed; and few provided sufficient detail to properly evaluate the statistical analyses and reported results. Most articles did, however, use the right statistic in the right way.
Discussion
The results of the audit indicate that attention to issues of statistical power and effect size is lacking in the IP articles reviewed. Most of the articles in Table 1 that received a "Y/N" rating for effect size indicators received the "Y" because they reported odds ratios (or, in some cases, standardized β weights for multiple regression), which by default convey magnitude (unlike, for example, the end result of an analysis of variance, t test, or χ 2 test. The importance of the omission of power analyses and effect sizes in IP articles should not be underestimated. Often, a very small p-value is enough to convey to the reader a sense of "importance" to the finding; conversely, a large p-value is enough to convey to the reader that the hypothesis was not supported. Yet, as the Methods section above indicated, this can be a mistake. Large sample sizes may generate small p-values for inconsequential effects; small sample sizes may generate large p-values for substantial effects. A power analysis forces the research to consider what magnitude of effect represents a "minimum meaningful difference," what magnitude of effect to expect from the study, and, for various sample sizes, what magnitude of effect the analysis is capable of finding "statistically significant." In combination with the actual effect sizes reported in the paper, attention to issues of power and effect magnitude is indispensable for evaluating the relevance and impact of the findings reported. For example, Weiner et al. (vol 15, issue 4, reported a χ 2 analysis to compare prevalence of current alcohol use between Native Americans and Whites. They concluded that "Native Americans' current use of alcohol and exposure to surgery with general anesthesia were significantly lower than Whites'." They reported a χ 2 value for the alcohol variable of 19.829 with a p-value of < .001. This may seem impressive, but if the effect size is computed, one finds that the Cramer's V (fourfold point correlation) value for this result is 0.17. Since V is interpreted like a correlation coefficient, it is apparent (from all effect size conventions) that this is a weak effect: race (Native American vs. White) explains less than 3% (0.17 2 = 0.029) of the "variance" in current alcohol use.
S S U E ): P A G E A T T E N T I O N T O E F F E C T S I Z E U N I V A R I A T E S T A T I S T I C E M P L O Y E D D A T A F O R S T A T I S T I C
The problem of multiple univariate analyses, though widespread, can be fixed in relatively easy ways. First, the number of outcome variables and covariates can be reduced to the most theoretically or clinically meaningful subset. This will reduce the number of analyses and also make it easier to adopt the next suggestion: multivariate analyses should be used where possible, at least as a precursor to univariate analyses. If the number of variables is limited, it is not much harder to do a multivariate analysis than it is to do many univariate analyses. Lastly, the easiest way to control for Type I error inflation is to adopt a more conservative p-value for significance. The simplest method, Bonferroni, requires dividing the acceptable alpha level (in practice, almost always 0.05) by the number of comparisons made. Other methods are also available (e.g., the Sidak adjustment). In addition to generating more accurate p-values, reducing the number of analyses also streamlines the results and tables and makes the conclusions more obvious. The last three criteria-choice of statistic, attention to data adequacy, and sufficient statistical detail-will be addressed together. For the most part, the articles reviewed incorporated the correct statistic (with the exception of the general tendency to disregard multivariate analyses). The articles by Mastwyk et al. (vol 15, issue 2, and Pinner and Bouman (vol 15, issue 3, pp. 279-288) received a "No" for this criterion because they did not report any statistical analyses where statistical analysis was probably warranted. With respect to attention to the adequacy of data, few articles specifically addressed this issue. Tabachnik and Fidell (1996) , in their excellent book on multivariate statistical analysis, devote an entire chapter to this issue. They discuss missing data, range and variability of scores, outliers, linearity and normality of distributions, homogeneity of variance, and multicollinearity as examples of oftoverlooked factors in data analysis that can attenuate/inflate correlations, inflate standard errors, attenuate/inflate effect sizes, generate inaccurate p-values, and produce generally unstable, nonreplicable results. One example: Gaugler et al.
(vol 15, issue 1, pp. 37-58) report means and standard deviations (SDs) for hours of caregiving for activities of daily living (ADLs). For the control group, the mean ADL hours is 1.74 and the SD is 2.37. Thus, the SD is nearly 37% larger than the mean value. This is often indicative of a seriously skewed data distribution or one or more dramatic outliers, which can attenuate effects. This issue is compounded by their calculation of change scores, which only augments the error. The final issue is equally important to the interpretation of any published article. The statistical information should be detailed enough to allow for a sophisticated review of the reported results. This level of detail is sometimes lacking in IP articles (perhaps for space reasons, if nothing else). While frequencies and measures of central tendency are almost always reported, the number of articles that omit indicators of variability is far too high. Further, detailed information on sample sizes is omitted, so that one is sometimes left wondering on which sample or subsample the analysis was done. Finally, the values of statistics, degrees of freedom, factor and discriminant function coefficients, names and values of post hoc tests, etc., should be provided in more detail, so that there is no mystery as to the origin of that "p < 0.001" in a table.
As a final comment, more often than not, authors of the papers reviewed here pointed out in the Discussion section one or more of the statistical limitations of the research. This took the form of noting unadjusted multiple comparisons or small sample sizes, for example. Nevertheless, the current audit suggests that these issues and other statistical basics could be addressed more proactively in the manuscripts, particularly with respect to power, effect size, and data description.
Conclusions
IP publishes excellent and important research in the field of geriatrics. The statistical quality of IP can be improved, however, by attention to a few relatively fundamental issues. Hopefully, this review highlights areas where improvement is possible, with the goal of making IP an even better outlet for psychogeriatric research.
